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Abstract—The area of distributed ledgers is a vast and quickly
developing landscape. At the heart of most distributed ledgers
is their consensus protocol. The consensus protocol describes the
way participants in a distributed network interact with each
other to obtain and agree on a shared state. While classical
consensus Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) algorithms are designed
to work in closed, size-limited networks only, modern distributed
ledgers – and blockchains in particular – often focus on open,
permissionless networks.
In this paper, we present a novel blockchain consensus algo-
rithm, called Albatross, inspired by speculative BFT algorithms.
Transactions in Albatross benefit from strong probabilistic final-
ity. We describe the technical specification of Albatross in detail
and analyse its security and performance. We conclude that the
protocol is secure under regular PBFT security assumptions and
has a performance close to the theoretical maximum for single-
chain Proof-of-Stake consensus algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most famous classical consensus algorithm is PBFT,
or practical Byzantine fault tolerance [1]. PBFT has greatly
influenced the field since its creation in 1999 and is now
a major component in many of the consensus algorithms
being used or developed for blockchains. However, classical
consensus theory has evolved significantly and, nowadays,
the BFT algorithms providing the highest performance are
speculative BFT algorithms.
Speculative BFT refers to a class of algorithms that have
two modes for consensus: (1) the optimistic mode, where it is
assumed that the nodes are well-behaved and so little security
measures are applied, instead preferring speed, and (2) the
pessimistic mode, where no such assumption is made and the
only goal is to make progress even in the presence of malicious
nodes.
The reason for speculative BFT algorithms being signifi-
cantly faster than non-speculative versions lies in the opti-
mistic mode, which allows them to compete with centralized
systems in terms of speed. The optimistic mode, however,
is not robust or safe at all, with any node being able to
make an invalid update. When that happens, speculative BFT
algorithms automatically enter into pessimistic mode, revert
the invalid update and then change back into optimistic mode.
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The idea here is deceptively simple. In PBFT, the nodes
adopt a “never trust” attitude, all updates to the ledger being
carried out with a focus on maximum security. In speculative
BFT, the nodes adopt a “trust but verify” attitude, being
allowed to make an update by themselves but with other nodes
verifying the update afterwards and it being reverted if it is
not valid.
Albatross, our novel blockchain 1 consensus algorithm, is
modeled after some of these speculative BFT algorithms like
Zyzzyva [2], but it also takes inspiration from other consensus
algorithms like Byzcoin [3], Algorand [4] and Bitcoin-NG [5].
II. OVERVIEW
In this section, we will give a summary of Albatross, de-
scribing in an intuitive fashion the different types of validators,
blocks and the chain selection algorithm. We also present the
behavior of the protocol in the optimistic mode, discuss the
ways validators may misbehave and how such misbehavior is
countered in our protocol.
We will focus on the general structure of Albatross and
leave the details for Section IV.
A. Validators
There are two types of validators: potential and active
validators. A potential validator is any node that has staked
tokens (i.e., tokens that are locked away for this purpose), so
that it can be selected for block production. An active validator
is a potential validator that was selected to produce blocks
during the current epoch and thus has an active role.
The set of all potential and active validators is called the
validator set. The list of active validators tasked to produce
blocks during a given epoch is called the validator list. Simi-
larly to other hybrid consensus algorithms, the validator list is
chosen at random from the validator set, and the probability
of a validator being chosen is proportional to its stake. Any
given validator can appear more than once in the validator list,
but only appears exactly one time in the validator set.
1It is important to note that we focus on a cryptocurrency use case here.
We assume that blocks contain transactions and that the underlying token has
a monetary value.
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B. Blocks
There are two types of blocks that are produced by the
validators:
• Macro blocks: These blocks are used to change the
validator list and contain the identities of the new active
validators. They do not contain user-generated transac-
tions. Macro blocks are produced with PBFT.
• Micro blocks: These blocks are the ones that contain
user-generated transactions. Each micro block is pro-
duced by a randomly chosen active validator and contains
not only the transactions to be included, but also the
current state and a random seed produced by the validator.
Micro blocks only need to be signed by the corresponding
elected validator.
One macro block is always followed by m micro blocks,
with this pattern repeating throughout the blockchain. An
epoch is composed of a macro block and the m micro blocks
that preceded it.
C. Chain selection
Nodes will believe the longest chain, by number of blocks,
to be the main chain. Note that, since macro blocks have
finality and are thus forkless, any fork can only happen
between two macro blocks. So, nodes only need to consider
chains that include the last macro block.
D. Optimistic mode
Now, we will consider what happens during an epoch in
Albatross, assuming that all validators are honest. We call this
the optimistic mode because we are trusting that the validators
will not misbehave.
1) At the beginning of an epoch a new validator list is cho-
sen at random. The validators are chosen proportionally
to their stake from the validator set.
2) Using a random seed, a validator is selected at random
to produce the next micro block. This validator is called
the slot owner.
3) The slot owner chooses which transactions to include
in the block and calculates the resulting state. He also
produces a new random seed that will be used to select
the slot owner for the next block.
4) He includes the transactions, the current state, and the
random seed in the block, signs it and relays it.
5) Now the next slot owner repeats the process and pro-
duces another micro block that appends some transac-
tions to the blockchain and picks the next slot owner.
This continues until the last micro block in the current
epoch, which will pick the validator that will be PBFT
leader for the macro block.
6) The PBFT leader will also produce a new random seed
which will be used to select a new validator list for the
next epoch. However, there are no transactions to include
in the block.
7) The leader and the other validators sign the block and
relay it.
Note that the validators will produce their random seeds
using a verifiable random function. A verifiable random func-
tion is a pseudo-random function that cannot be manipulated
by the validator and so guarantees a fair selection.
E. Misbehaving validators
The protocol above constitutes the optimistic case, assuming
honest validators. However, Albatross also needs to be able
to withstand malicious validators. To this end, we present
appropriate measures for the three ways in which a validator
can misbehave: producing an invalid block, creating a fork,
and delaying a block.
1) Forks: Forks are not possible during a macro block,
because PBFT is a forkless protocol. But a fork can be created
if a validator produces more than one micro block in the same
slot. To deal with this, we introduce fork proofs. Anyone can
create a fork proof. Two block headers, at the same slot, signed
by the same validator, constitute sufficient proof.
If a malicious validator creates or continues a fork, even-
tually an honest validator will produce a block containing a
fork proof and the malicious validator will be punished.
2) Delays: Validators can potentially take a long time to
produce a block, either because they went offline or because
they maliciously try to delay the block production. In both
cases, we need to change the slot owner. To this end, we use
the view change protocol of PBFT.
After receiving a block, each validator starts a countdown.
If he doesn’t receive the next block before the timer ends, he
sends out a message requesting a view change (a change of the
slot owner). Any validator that receives such messages from
at least two-thirds of the validator list, will no longer accept a
block from the current slot owner. Instead, a new slot owner
is chosen to produce a block and a new countdown begins.
The new slot owner is chosen in the following way. The
random seed and a counter are hashed together to produce a
random value that is used to pick a validator from the validator
list. By increasing the counter, we can create an ordered list of
slot owners. If the first slot owner does not produce a block in
time, the second slot owner is selected to produce the block. If
the second slot owner also fails to produce a block, the third
slot owner is selected and so on.
3) Invalid blocks: When a validator produces an invalid
block, either when he is the slot owner for a micro block or
the PBFT leader for a macro block, the other validators just
need to ignore that block.
4) Punishment: Validators that fork or delay blocks are
punished in the same way: they get banned from producing any
more micro blocks during the current epoch and their reward
for the whole epoch is burned. Moreover, such validators
are marked to be automatically removed from the registry of
potential validators if they do not prove being active within
two epochs.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance
The practical Byzantine fault tolerance consensus algorithm,
or PBFT for short, was introduced by Castro and Liskov in
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1999 [1].
Assuming that there are 3f + 1 nodes, PBFT can tolerate
up to f faults and, thus, is optimal for a partially synchronous
BFT protocol. There are several slightly different variants of
PBFT but we will only describe the one used in Albatross.
PBFT proceeds in four rounds:
• Pre-prepare: In this phase, the leader multicasts a block
proposal to the rest of the validator list.
• Prepare: After receiving the block proposal, each valida-
tor determines if it is valid. If it is, he calculates the block
hash h and signs a message saying 〈PREPARE, h〉. Then,
he multicasts the signature to the rest of the validator list.
The leader also sends a prepare message.
• Commit: If a validator receives prepare messages from
at least 2f + 1 validators, he signs a message saying
〈COMMIT, h〉 and multicasts it to the rest of the validator
list.
• Reply: If a validator receives 2f + 1 commit messages
from validators who also sent prepare messages, the block
is considered finalized. Then, he gossips the block to the
network.
Instead of sending all signatures in the block separately, we
can save space by aggregating them. This way all the prepare
messages are aggregated into a single signature and a bitmap
is created stating which validators sent prepare messages. The
exact same is done to the commit messages. So the justification
for the block consists just of the two aggregated signatures and
the corresponding bitmaps.
B. Boneh-Lynn-Shacham signatures
Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) is a signature scheme that
was first introduced in 2004 [6] and uses both elliptic curve
cryptography and bilinear pairings. Its security is less con-
servative than some other more commonly used digital sig-
nature schemes (for example ECDSA and Schnorr), but is
still considered secure by the majority of the cryptography
community. It also offers several advantages over ECDSA
and Schnorr, namely: shorter signature sizes, deterministic
signatures, and simple schemes for signature aggregation,
threshold signatures, and multisignatures.
To understand BLS, first it is necessary to understand
bilinear pairings. A bilinear pairing is a function that takes
two elliptic curves points, possibly in two different curves
and outputs a point in another curve. It also must have the
bilinearity property. A more precise definition is:
Let G1 and G2 be additive groups of prime order
p, and GT be a multiplicative group also of prime
order p. Let P ∈ G1 and Q ∈ G2 be generators
of G1 and G2, respectively, and a, b ∈ Zp. Then,
a bilinear is a map e : G1 × G2 → GT such that
e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab and e(P,Q) 6= 1.
For such bilinear pairings, e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab implies
that e(xP,Q) = e(P, xQ).
BLS signatures only require a bilinear pairing (with the
curves to support it) and a hash function that maps to el-
liptic curve points in G1. This hash function is defined as
h : M → G1. Given these primitives, the BLS signature
scheme is defined as follows:
• Key generation: Choose at random an integer x R←− Zp
and calculate Y = xQ. The secret key is x and the public
key is Y .
• Signing: Let m ∈ M be the message. To create a
signature, the message needs to be hashed H = h(m).
Then, calculate the signature as σ = xH .
• Verifying: Given a signature σ and a public key Y , accept
the signature if e(σ,Q) = e(H,Y ).
As we have said before, BLS has a number of desirable fea-
tures. One that is useful for our design is signature aggregation.
BLS allows to combine n signatures of n different signers into
a single signature thus saving a considerable amount of space.
The scheme is as follows:
• Setup: Each of the n signers creates a secret key xi and
a public key Yi.
• Signing: Each of the n signers uses their secret key to
create signatures σi.
• Aggregation: The aggregated signature is simply the sum
of all individual signatures σ =
∑n
i=1 σi.
• Verifying: Calculate the aggregate public key Y =∑n
i=1 Yi. Accept the signature σ if e(σ,Q) = e(H,Y ).
C. Verifiable Random Functions
A verifiable random function is a pseudo-random function
that can provide publicly verifiable proofs that its output is
correct.
More formally, after a user creates a public key Y and a
secret key x, given an input s, the user can calculate the VRF
pi, r = VRFx(s). Here, r is the pseudo-random output and
pi is a proof for the correct computation of it. Then, anyone
who knows the public key and the proof can verify that r was
correctly computed, without learning the secret key x.
Verifiable random functions have three important properties:
• Pseudo-randomness: The only way of predicting the
output, better than guessing randomly, is to calculate the
function.
• Uniqueness: For each input s and secret key x there is
only one possible output r.
• Public verifiability: Anyone can verify that the output
was correctly computed.
The BLS signature scheme has all these properties with the
advantage that the signature serve as both the pseudo-random
value and proof of correctness. For this paper we will use we
will use BLS signatures as a simple verifiable random function.
IV. SPECIFICATION
We will now give the technical specification of Albatross,
describing in detail the networking, all of the validator’s
functions and processes, the block’s format, the misbehavior
handling protocols, the rewards and punishments, and the
chain selection algorithm.
3
A. Networking
We choose S/Kademlia [7] for peer routing. S/Kademlia is a
hardened version of the Kademlia distributed hash table, which
greatly improves resistance of the network to eclipse and Sybil
attacks. We recommend that all communication between peers
is encrypted and gossiped.
By gossip we refer to when a node sends a message to
its connected neighbors, those neighbors relay the message
to their neighbors and so on until the message has been
propagated through the entire network.
Always gossiping messages increases the DoS resistance
of the validators. This is because each node only accepts
incoming connections from a small set of other nodes and
those connections tend to be long-lived. An attacker most
likely won’t be able to connect directly to a validator and
must instead connect to other full nodes.
Honest full nodes will not relay invalid messages and so end
up acting as guards to the validators. As the number of honest
full nodes increases, so does the resistance of the network to
DoS attacks.
We also define transactions as any input to the state
transition function and differentiate between two types of
transactions: internal and external. External transactions are
transactions that are propagated through the network and
signed. They are typically used by the users to interact with
the blockchain, for example for transferring tokens. Internal
transactions are neither propagated nor signed, and are instead
included in a block by its producer. An example would be a
timestamp of a block.
B. Validator keys
Each potential validator needs to keep a set of three keys:
a cold key, a warm key and a hot key.
The cold key is simply the key of the account of the
validator. It is used to both stake and unstake funds.
The warm key is a key chosen by the validator when
he initially stakes funds. This key will be used both to
prove availability and sign some signaling transactions (see
Section IV-C).
Finally, the hot key is a BLS key (see Section III-B), which
is created for the sole purpose of signing blocks and producing
new random seeds (see Section III-C). This key is also chosen
by the validator.
The reason to have three separate keys is operational secu-
rity. The hot key and the warm key need to be kept online in
order to produce blocks and do other consensus-related tasks.
But having a cold key, which is used only for accessing the
account, allows validators to still keep their funds in a cold
wallet.
C. Validator signaling
There are three types of transactions that nodes can send to
the network to change their validator status. These transactions
signal their desire to become a validator, to stop being a
validator and to change their validator information.
1) Staking: When nodes want to become validators, they
must send a staking transaction. A staking transaction has six
pieces of information:
• Main address: The funds to be staked are taken from
this address. It also doubles as the public cold key.
• Amount: The amount of tokens to be locked up while
the node is a validator.
• Warm key: The public warm key.
• Hot key: The public hot key.
• Proof of knowledge of secret key: This is a signature
of the hot public key using the corresponding secret key.
It is used to prevent rogue key attacks.
• Reward address: An optional address the rewards from
staking are paid to. If no reward address is given, the
rewards will be added to the stake.
The result of the staking transaction is to lock the desired
amount of tokens from the main address and adding the
amount, the main address, the warm key, the hot key and the
reward address to an on-chain registry of potential validators.
After the node is added to the registry, it becomes a potential
validator. So, if the node gets selected to be an active validator
in the next macro block, it can start producing blocks.
A staking transaction is, of course, signed with the valida-
tor’s cold key.
2) Restaking: A restaking transaction allows validators to
change some of the information stored in the validator registry.
The transaction is signed with the warm key and consists of
these four fields:
• Amount: The new amount of tokens to be staked.
• Hot key: The new public hot key.
• Proof of knowledge of secret key: The proof of knowl-
edge for the new hot key.
• Reward address: The new optional reward address.
Evidently, this transaction can be used to update the stake
amount, the hot key and the reward address of a validator. For
efficiency reasons, some of the fields can be left blank, if the
validator does not wish to update them.
3) Unstaking: When nodes wish to stop being validators
they need to send an unstaking transaction. An unstaking
transaction is a message, signed with the validator’s cold key,
expressing that the node no longer wishes to be a validator.
After the transaction gets accepted, the deposit is returned to
the validator’s address and all his information (address, warm
key and hot key) is deleted from the registry.
After sending an unstaking transaction, validators are re-
quired to remain as validators until the end of the epoch and
their deposit can only be withdrawn after the end of the next
epoch. Delaying the return of the deposit is required to allow
the punishment of past validators who misbehaved right before
the end of the epoch.
D. Validator selection
There are two cases in which it is needed to select a random
subset of validators: at the end of an epoch when a new
validator list is chosen and before every micro block to choose
the next slot owner from the validator list.
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1) Random seed generation: For producing the random
seeds we rely on the BLS signature scheme as an instantiation
of a verifiable random function.
In the genesis block there will be an initial random seed.
This initial seed will need to be sourced from the outside
world. We can use, for example, lottery numbers [8] or the
hashes of Bitcoin headers [9]. Another possibility, to further
reduce any possibility of bias in the initial seed, is to employ
distributed randomness generation algorithms [10]. We just
take that entropy, hash it and convert it into an elliptic curve
point.
In subsequent blocks, the random seed is produced as the
BLS signature of the previous seed by the block producer (or
PBFT leader in the case of a macro block). This creates an
infinite chain of BLS signatures and random seeds.
2) Validator list: In Albatross the entire validator list is
changed every epoch. The random seed present in every block,
which we will use to select the new set, is a BLS signature
and, hence, an elliptic curve point. We denote that point by S.
To select the new validator list, we start by getting the
addresses and the corresponding deposit amount of every
potential validator. Then, we order the addresses in a deter-
ministic way (for example, by lexicographic order). Lastly, we
map the ordered addresses to their deposit amount, such that
the deposit amount represents a range. For example, if there
are 10 tokens staked by A1, 50 tokens by A2 and 15 tokens by
A3, then the mapping would be the one shown in table IV-D2.
TABLE I
VALIDATOR STAKES ORDERED AND MAPPED TO RANGES
Address Deposit Range
A1 10 [0, 9]
A2 50 [10, 59]
A3 15 [60, 74]
With this mapping, we can now run Algorithm 1 to select
the new validator list 2.
Algorithm 1 Validator list selection algorithm
validator list = {}
S = random seed
t = total amount staked
i = 0
while validator list is not full do
r = hash(S || i) mod t
v = potential validator whose range contains r
add v to validator list
i = i+ 1
end while
return validator list
2This way of selecting a validator list is only illustrative, and so is
purposefully simple and naive. There are many algorithms that can be used to
sample from a discrete distribution, several of which are more efficient than
the one showed here.
3) Slot owner list: Given a random seed S and a validator
list, we can create a random ordering of the validator list to
produce the next block. This random ordering is called the
slot owner list. While, in general, only the first validator of
that list will actually produce the block, the rest of the list can
be relied upon in case the first validator does not respond in
time.
The algorithm for calculating this ordered list is as follows.
First, we take the addresses of all the n active validators and
order them deterministically. Then, we number them from 0
to n− 1. Now, we can run Algorithm 2 to produce the list of
slot owners.
Algorithm 2 Slot owner selection algorithm
validator list = {v1, v2, . . . , vn}
slot owner list = {}
S = random seed
i = 0
while validator list is not empty do
n = validator list size
r = hash(S || i) mod n
v = active validator numbered r
add v to slot owner list
remove v from validator list
i = i+ 1
end while
return slot owner list
E. Block format
We model the format of both macro and micro blocks like
this:
• Header: The block header.
• Digest: A field containing auxiliary data that may be
necessary for synchronization (see Section VI). It will
mostly be composed of internal transactions.
• Transactions: The data to be input into the state transi-
tion function. It will consist mostly of external transac-
tions.
• Justification: The information necessary to make the
block valid according to the consensus rules.
Although the state would also technically be part of the
block, we do not include it since it usually is not propagated
in the network as part of a block. The block header consists
of the following components:
• Parent hash: The hash of the previous block header.
• Block number: The number of the current block.
• View number: The view number (see Section IV-F) of
the current block.
• Digest root: The root of the Merkle tree containing the
digest.
• Transactions root: The root of the Merkle tree of the
transactions.
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• State root: The root of the Merkle tree 3 of the state.
However, we can be more specific regarding the information
that needs to be included in macro and micro blocks.
The header is equal for both micro and macro blocks. For
the body, we will explain both the digest, the transactions and
the justification in more detail.
1) Micro blocks:
• Digest: The digest consists of the timestamp, the random
seed and, when necessary, any aggregated view change
messages and fork proofs.
• Transactions: The transactions field contains all of the
external transactions.
• Justification: The justification consists only of an iden-
tifier 4 and the signature of the validator that produced
the block.
2) Macro blocks:
• Digest: The digest of a macro block contains all the
same information as the digest of a micro block plus the
(public) hot keys of the new validator list and the hash
of the previous macro block header.
• Transactions: A macro block cannot have any external
transactions so this field will be empty.
• Justification: Since this is a PBFT block, the justification
consists of the two rounds of validator signatures (see
Section III-A).
F. View change protocol
If a validator, for some reason, does not produce a block
during his slot there needs to be a process to allow another
validator to produce the block. This process is the view change
protocol and is closely modeled after the protocol of the same
name in PBFT.
Given 3f + 1 active validators (of which at most f are
malicious), a list of slot owners {s1, s2, . . . , sn} and a time-
out parameter 5 ∆, each active validator runs Algorithm 3
immediately after receiving a block. A view number keeps
track of the current index within the slot owner list.
It is important to clarify and understand the following points
with regards to this algorithm.
First, a view change message is a signed message containing
the statement 〈VIEW-CHANGE, i, b〉, where i is the current
view number as defined in the algorithm above and b is the
current block number.
Second, for the next block to be accepted, it must include
2f + 1 view change messages accepting its producer at i+ 1.
Third, after the timeout, a node will wait indefinitely for
either the block or 2f+1 view change messages to be received.
3It is worth noting that the state does not necessarily need to be represented
in a Merkle tree, but that the usage of other advancements, such as batchable
RSA based accumulators [11], are possible as well.
4This identifier can either be the (public) hot key of the validator or the
position of the validator in the validator list.
5For this paper we will consider that this parameter is static and hardcoded
into the software, but it is possible to have the parameter be updated
dynamically by using a combination of the timestamps and the number of
view changes that happened in the recent past. The dynamic update protocol
would be similar to how PoW blockchains adjust their mining difficulty.
Algorithm 3 View change algorithm
i = 0 (view change number)
loop
wait for (i+ 1) ·∆ time
if a valid block was received from si then
terminate algorithm
else
broadcast a view change message
end if
if 2f + 1 view change messages are received then
commit to not accepting a block from si in this slot
i = i+ 1
end if
end loop
Fourth, note that after a node receives 2f + 1 view change
messages, it will no longer accept, or build on, a block from
the delayed slot owner. Even if the node has received the block
before completing the 2f + 1 view change messages.
Fifth, a block with a higher view number always has priority
over a block with a lower view number. So, if a fork is created
because of a view change, the chain that starts with the block
containing the highest view number is always preferred.
G. Fork proofs
When a validator creates two or more micro blocks in the
same slot, he is punished by having his reward for the epoch
slashed. We do not care if a PBFT leader proposes two macro
blocks because this situation will not result in a fork.
It is worth noting that if a validator produces two micro
blocks, one valid and one invalid, he will still be slashed,
even though he did not create a fork. We opt for this in order
to reduce the size of the fork proof. It is easier to prove that
two blocks exist in the same slot than that two valid blocks
exist in the same slot.
The fork proof consists of two block headers and their
respective justifications. In order for the fork proof to be valid
the following conditions must be met:
• The block headers must have the same block number and
view number.
• The justifications must be valid.
This essentially proves that a validator created, or continued,
a fork. A fork proof only punishes a single entry in the list
of active validators. If a validator has multiple entries in the
active validator list, only the one that owned the misbehaving
slot will be punished. Also, if there are multiple misbehaving
validators, several fork proofs have to be included into the
blockchain.
H. Rewards
The rewards, consisting of the coinbase plus the transaction
fees, are always divided equally among all active validators.
Additionally, the rewards for an entire epoch are only
distributed at the end of the next epoch (on the macro block).
So, the reward distribution is always delayed by one epoch.
6
The reason for this delay is to allow ample time for validators
to submit fork proofs before the rewards are distributed.
Note that validators do not need a large incentive to produce
blocks since block production in Albatross is extremely cheap.
No expensive mining equipment or GPUs are needed, and any
regular computer with a good internet connection suffices.
I. Punishments
Whether a validator delays a block or creates a fork, he is
punished in the same way:
• The misbehaving validator is no longer considered in the
slot owner selection, i.e., he is barred from producing
any more micro blocks, and from being the leader of
the macro block, during the current epoch. However, he
can still participate in the view change and macro block
voting.
• His reward is confiscated and burned 6.
• He is marked to be expelled from the validator registry.
Just like in an unstaking transaction, the deposit is
returned to the validator and his information is deleted
from the registry.
The prohibition of producing micro blocks is applied im-
mediately after a view change (for a delay) or in the block
where a fork proof is included (for a fork).
However, the reward confiscation and the validator registry
expulsion only happen on the macro block at the end of the
next epoch. In other words, it happens at the same time the
rewards are distributed.
Note that fork proofs can be submitted until the end of the
epoch after the one where the fork occurred. In addition, a
validator that delayed a block can avoid being expelled from
the validator registry if he can prove, before the end of the
next epoch, that he is available and still knows his secret hot
key 7.
Producing invalid blocks is not punished in any way since
it does not impact the consensus.
J. Chain selection
The chain selection algorithm is more complex than our
brief description of it in the overview section since it needs to
take into account malicious forks and view changes. We use
the following cumulative conditions, from highest to lowest
priority, to choose a chain:
1) The chain with the most macro blocks.
2) The chain that has the blocks with the highest view
number.
3) The chain with the most blocks.
Still, it is possible for two chains to tie on all three
conditions (for example, when a malicious validator creates a
fork). In that case both chains are considered equal and there
6The reward is not divided among the other validators so as to not
incentivize them to attack each other (ex: by doing a denial-of-service).
7This can be done either by signing the macro block or perhaps by
submitting a special transaction (signed with the warm key) containing the
validator’s public hot key and a proof of knowledge of secret key. The details
are left open for the implementation.
is no clear chain to select. Thus, the next slot owner can build
on top of either one.
V. STAKING POOLS
In proof-of-work protocols, miners tend to form groups
in order to combine their hashpower together and share the
rewards. These groups are, of course, mining pools and they
are a major part of PoW blockchains.
A similar concept exists for proof-of-stake protocols: the
staking pools. Like with mining pools, in staking pools stakers
combine their stakes together and divide the rewards.
A. Comparison with mining pools
The reason for the existence of mining pools is that they
reduce the variance of rewards for the miners. A miner that
only has a small fraction of the total hashpower of a given
blockchain can only expect to receive a reward very rarely but,
if he joins a mining pool he can receive smaller rewards with a
higher frequency. The miner ends up with a more predictable
and steady cashflow.
Evidently, mining pools charge a fee for their service but it
is normally very small. For most users the reduction in reward
variance compensates the small reduction in the expected
reward. This is because of two reasons:
1) A majority of people are risk-averse.
2) Miners have fixed expenses (electricity, equipment, etc).
If they don’t receive a reward for a long enough time,
they can become bankrupt.
Staking pools, similarly to mining pools, allow stakers to
trade profit for decreased variance, resulting in more steady
earnings. So, the first reason for the existence of mining pools,
risk aversion, also applies to staking pools.
The second reason though does not apply because, unlike
miners, stakers don’t have significant fixed expenses. A staker,
in addition to coins, only needs a decent computer and a
good internet connection, both of which are relatively cheap.
Consequently, stakers face little risk of ruin.
Stakers have a different reason to use staking pools, and
it is convenience. While acquiring hashpower can be quite
difficult, requiring a high degree of technical knowledge and
high capital costs, acquiring coins is easily achieved by most
cryptocurrency users. The issue then becomes that many coin-
holders will not have the technical knowledge or disposition
to run a full-node, a task that is necessary to produce blocks.
Staking pools solve this problem, by offering to handle all the
required technical complexity in exchange for a small fee.
B. Decentralization
The different set of incentives that rule mining pools and
staking pools also influence the decentralization of PoW and
PoS blockchains.
The barrier of entry to become a miner is high, which results
in a small number of miners to begin with. And since miners
only care about reward variance, they tend to join the largest
mining pools. All of this results in PoW blockchains being
dominated by just a few very large mining pools.
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However, to become a staker it is only needed to buy coins
so the number of stakers can potentially be as large as the
number of coinholders. Variance is also not as important to
stakers, for whom convenience is often the primary concern.
This normally means that there is a diverse array of institutions
offering staking services, like exchanges, wallets, custodians,
etc. Thus, PoS blockchains tend to be significantly more
decentralized when compared to PoW blockchains.
In general, we believe that staking pools contribute posi-
tively to the security of PoS blockchains because they increase
the total number of coins being staked while keeping the
network reasonably decentralized.
C. Stake delegation
Stake delegation refers to the practice of a coinholder
delegating his staking power 8 to a third-party without giving
the same third-party access to the coins. Normally, stake dele-
gation is a layer 1 feature of PoS blockchains and is absolutely
necessary for the existence of staking pools. Without stake
delegation, only custodial staking pools can exist.
In Albatross, thanks to the different validating keys, it is
possible to do stake delegation. Imagine that Charlie is a
coinholder and Paula is a staking pool operator. All that Paula
needs to do in order to start a pool is to create an address
and a BLS keypair and publish them. Then Charlie can send
a staking transaction (see Section IV-C) with Paula’s public
BLS key as the hot key and Paula’s address as the reward
address.
Now Charlie knows the cold and warm keys, which gives
him control over his funds, while Paula knows the hot key,
giving her control over the block production. The rewards are
deposited into Paula’s address, who then will share them with
the pool users. To join another stake pool Charlie only needs
to send a restaking transaction with the new pool’s hot key
and reward address.
Also, since Paula can watch the blockchain and see when
any staking (also restaking or unstaking) transactions appear
that use her hot key, there is no need for Charlie to coordinate
with Paula. All needed information is already communicated
on-chain.
In case Charlie tries leveraging Paula’s stake pool by adding
her hot key while retaining the rewards for himself by using
his own reward address, Paula can detect this misbehavior.
Moreover, she does not need to produce any blocks in case
Charlie’s entry is selected as a slot owner as this will only
slash the rewards for Charlie.
VI. SYNCHRONIZATION
New nodes who want to join the network need a way of
synchronizing with the blockchain, since the only information
they start with is the genesis block, which is hardcoded into the
client software. However, the way in which they synchronize
depends on what type of node they are: archival, full or light.
8In some PoS blockchains, stake delegation can also refer to delegating
voting power.
A. Archival nodes
Archival nodes need to download and verify all the blocks,
including the micro blocks, without exception. They are the
safest option to synchronize but also the slowest, requiring
the node to download vast amounts of data. Also has the
disadvantage that the amount of data to download grows
linearly with time, thus the synchronization time for archival
nodes increases over the life of the blockchain. We expect
archival nodes to be run only by businesses and other public
services (for example, block explorers).
B. Full nodes
Full nodes only need to be able to produce blocks and
as such they mainly need to learn the current state of the
blockchain. To synchronize, full nodes begin by downloading
all the macro block headers (including the digests) since
genesis. Since each macro block header contains the hash of
the previous macro block header, and the validator list only
changes at the macro blocks, the macro block headers form
a chain that allows anyone to be certain of the latest macro
block header.
After verifying the latest macro block header, the full node
then requests the state, which he can check against the state
root. To finalize he downloads and verifies all of the micro
blocks that were produced since the last macro block. The
full node synchronization is now complete and he can start
verifying, or even producing, new blocks.
This synchronization option is much faster than the archival
node synchronization, in fact only the macro block headers, the
state and a constant number of micro blocks (in average half
of one epoch) are downloaded. The synchronization time for a
full node still grows linearly over time, but much more slowly,
only adding one macro block header each epoch. Furthermore,
in order to save disk space, full nodes can safely prune the
micro blocks of old epochs.
Alternatively, if syncing the state is deemed to be too slow,
it is also possible to augment the macro blocks with a hash
of a Merkle tree over all transactions in the corresponding
epoch. Then, instead of downloading the state, full nodes can
just download all the transactions and calculate the resulting
state.
Note that full nodes in Albatross do not verify blocks before
the current epoch, instead only verifying blocks after the last
macro block. This makes them strictly unsafer than archival
nodes, but only marginally 9. As long as, at all points of the
life of the blockchain, there was at least one honest full node,
this synchronization method is secure.
9In order for an invalid block to permanently become part of the blockchain
and be accepted by every future full node, then all of the existent full nodes
when the invalid block was produced must collude. If a single honest validator
exists at that time, he can store the block and provide it as proof that the
current blockchain is not valid. The process to inform the community that
the blockchain has been compromised has to be necessarily off-chain and
informal, but is nevertheless possible.
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C. Light nodes
Light nodes, also called light clients, have the fastest syn-
chronization but also offer the fewest security guarantees. In
addition to that, they are unable to verify or produce blocks.
Light clients start their synchronization in the same way as
full nodes, by downloading all of the macro block headers
and their digests. But then they only download the headers
and the digests of all of the micro blocks that were produced
in the current epoch.
After synchronization, light nodes are only aware of the
current validator list and the state root. However, this is all
that is needed to securely query the blockchain state. The light
client can simply ask other full nodes or archival nodes for
specific parts of the state together with corresponding Merkle
proofs and just check it against the state root.
The synchronization time for light nodes also grows linearly,
in fact at the same rate as for full nodes, but since a light client
only downloads headers and digests and does no verification,
it is much faster to synchronize a light node.
Light nodes are intended to be run only by end-users of the
blockchain, especially in highly constrained environments like
browsers and smartphones.
There is also a different way of implementing light nodes,
by relying on zero-knowledge proofs, that can significantly
speed up the process of synchronizing the chain. In particular,
there are two options to use zero-knowledge proofs in the light
nodes implementation.
First, other nodes can provide non-recursive zero-knowledge
proofs, proving that the chain of macro blocks was correctly
constructed. This includes that each macro block is signed by
at least two thirds of the keys present in the previous macro
block and that the hash pointing to the previous macro block
is correct. Depending on the zero-knowledge proof system
employed, this can lead to a constant or logarithmic sized
proof, and constant or logarithmic verification complexity.
The downside, however, is that the prover has to construct a
new zero-knowledge proof for every macro block. To reduce
the computation needed, nodes could create such proofs only
for some macro blocks and a full or light sync is performed
from there on.
The second option is to leverage recent advances in the con-
struction of recursive zero-knowledge proofs [12] [13]. These
proofs have the advantage that they can be extended recur-
sively. Thus, the prover can construct a new zero-knowledge
proof for every macro block only with the knowledge of
the previous proof, the previous macro block and the current
macro block.
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We will now analyze the security of Albatross. First, we
will introduce the adversary model and then we will discuss
static and adaptive adversaries, network partitions, probabilis-
tic finality, and transaction censorship.
A. Adversarial Model
We need to start by defining the adversarial model, in other
words, we need to state what type of attacker we expect to
encounter. First, we will give definitions for the different types
of economic actors:
• Altruistic actor: Follows the protocol even if it is
prejudicial to him.
• Honest actor: Follows the protocol as long as it is not
prejudicial to him.
• Rational adversary: Deviates from the protocol if it is
profitable to him.
• Malicious adversary: Deviates from the protocol even
if it is prejudicial to him.
In Albatross, the validator list is chosen randomly from the
larger set of potential validators. There is a connection between
the percentage of the total stake controlled by an individual
and the number of validators that he gets to control. In fact,
for a validator list of size n, if someone controls a fraction p
of the entire stake then the probability of him gaining control
of at least x validators is given by the cumulative binomial
distribution:
P (X ≥ x) =
n∑
k=x
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k (1)
Lamport et al. have shown that any reliable, deterministic
Byzantine fault tolerant algorithm is only resistant up to
bn−13 c of malicious nodes [14]. Thus, we are interested in
the maximum fraction of stake p an adversary may control
before exceeding this bound:
P (X ≥ bn− 1
3
c) ≤ ⇔ (2)
⇔
n∑
k=x
(
n
k
)
pk(1− p)n−k ≤  (3)
with  > 0 being practically negligible.
For our protocol, we show that an adversary controlling at
most p = 14 of the total stake, yields a practically negligible
probability  for a suitable size n of the validator list. Table
II presents the result of our calculations based on varying
numbers of n.
TABLE II
PROBABILITY OF AN ADVERSARY WITH 1
4
OF THE TOTAL STAKE
CONTROLLING 1
3
OF THE VALIDATOR LIST
Number of validators n 200 300 400 500
Probability (%) 0.678 0.075 0.013 0.002
If Albatross has a validator list greater than 500 validators,
we can consider the statement “controlling less than 14 of the
total stake” to be with overwhelming probability equivalent to
the statement “controlling less than 13 of the validator list”.
Thus, the main security assumption that we use for Alba-
tross is the following:
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Less than 14 of the total stake is controlled by malicious
adversaries.
This corresponds to:
Less than 13 of the validator list is controlled by malicious
adversaries.
Since it is more convenient, it is the latter one that we will
actually use during the remainder of this analysis. The other
assumption we need to make regarding the adversarial model
is the following:
There is no set of rational adversaries, controlling 13 or
more of the validator list, that is capable of colluding.
Although similar to the first assumption, it actually models a
different case. The first assumption deals only with malicious
adversaries, who do not need any strong coordination in order
to stop the network. The second assumption deals with rational
adversaries for whom stopping the network is not a viable
attack since they cannot derive any economic reward from it.
Rational adversaries only care about double-spending at-
tacks, which they can use to increase their profit. However,
double-spending is an attack that requires all of the attackers
to collude. So there is no security issue even if all of the
validator list is controlled by rational adversaries, only if those
adversaries are capable of colluding.
To conclude, in the next sections we will analyze the
security of Albatross and argue that it is secure under the
following two assumptions:
1) Less than 13 of the validator list is controlled by mali-
cious adversaries.
2) There is no set of rational adversaries, controlling 13 or
more of the validator list, that is capable of colluding.
B. Static adversary
To begin, we will discuss attacks by a static adversary,
which in this context means an adversary that, at the beginning
of the protocol, can corrupt specific nodes but later cannot
change which nodes are corrupted.
In this case, Albatross has a security model very similar
to PBFT. The main difference between PBFT and Albatross
is that in PBFT all blocks have provable finality, so all
transactions are irreversible as soon as they get published in a
block. In contrast to PBFT, transactions in Albatross have only
probabilistic finality within an epoch, although the probability
of reversibility is exponentially decreasing.
Depending on the number x of validators controlled by the
adversary, on a validator list of size 3f + 1, there are three
possible cases:
• x ≤ f : The attacker can’t harm the network in any way.
• f < x ≤ 2f : The attacker can delay the network
indefinitely by stalling the view change protocol. Also,
by exploiting the view change protocol and the chain
selection rules, he can revert arbitrarily long chains within
an epoch 10.
• x > 2f : The attacker has complete control over the
network: he can delay it, create forks and publish invalid
blocks.
A rational adversary will not produce forks or invalid
blocks, or deviate from the protocol in any way, unless he
owns more than f of the validators, since their misbehavior
is easily observable and it would result in loss of the rewards.
Only malicious adversaries would deviate from the protocol
in this situation and, by our assumption, they must control f
validators or less.
Note that, if the rational adversary owns more than f
validators, he will certainly perform double-spending attacks
since he can gain money from the attack and still receive
the validator reward. So double-spending would be the profit-
maximizing behavior for him.
C. Adaptive adversary
Next, we discuss adaptive adversaries. These are adversaries
that can only corrupt a given number of nodes but, at any time,
can change which nodes are corrupted.
We only need to consider the case in which the adversary
can corrupt at most f validators. If he can corrupt more than
that, he can already compromise the consensus algorithm in
the static case.
The simplest way of attacking Albatross in the adaptive case
is for the adversary to be always corrupting the slot owner and
refusing to produce and propose blocks, thus preventing the
algorithm from making any progress.
To achieve this, however, the adversary needs to know
the next slot owner before he has a chance of producing a
block. Since the slot owner for a given slot is only selected
in the previous block and the slot owner does not require
any interaction with other validators to produce a block, the
adversary must learn who is the slot owner before the slot
owner himself does.
Naively, the attacker can create many nodes in the network
so that he can receive a block before the next slot owner
does. That will give him an antecedence of roughly the block
propagation time over the slot owner. The attacker would thus
need to compromise the next slot owner during this short
period of time.
Another strategy for him is to wait for his turn to produce
a block. Now he can learn the identity of the next slot owner
before he gossips the block. However, he still needs to gossip
the block before a view change happens, or another validator
10To perform this attack the adversary needs to be the first owner in a slot
for a micro block. Lets also imagine that he controls f + 1 validators. Then
he withholds his block until he receives view change messages from at least
f other nodes. His validators will produce view change messages but not
broadcast them. Finally, he will release his block. Now, until the end of the
epoch, he can release the view change messages that he withheld. This will
result in a total of 2f+1 view changes being broadcast and a new block being
produced for that slot. Since the new block has a higher priority according to
the chain selection rules, the network will ignore the previous fork and start
building on the new block.
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will produce a block and the slot owner will change. Using
this technique the attacker now can have an antecedence equal
to the timeout ∆.
After the attacker corrupts the first slot owner, because the
timeout increases linearly, he has ∆ time to corrupt the second
slot owner, 2∆ time to corrupt the third, and so on.
Strictly speaking, an adaptive adversary can corrupt nodes
instantly, but a more realistic model considers that it takes
some time to corrupt a node. Independently of the strategy
used, in Albatross an adaptive attacker would need to corrupt
nodes on the order of seconds.
D. Network partition
From the CAP theorem [15], we know that when suffering
a network partition a blockchain can only maintain either
consistency or availability. PBFT favors consistency over
availability and will stop in the presence of a network partition.
Albatross also favors consistency, but can still produce a few
micro blocks before stopping.
Note that, if the network is split in half, it is possible for
one half to contain the owners of the next z slots. In this case,
z blocks will be produced and then a view change will be
attempted (because the next slot owner is part of the other
partition) but will fail because it needs 2f + 1 view change
messages. Hence, as a result of the network partition, one half
will immediately stop, while the other half will produce one
or more blocks before stopping.
When the network partition ends, Albatross will quickly
resume its normal operation. The z blocks produced by one
half will be accepted by the other half and then the nodes can
start producing blocks from there.
It is worth noting that when the network splits into two parts,
if one of the parts has 2f+1 or more rational validators, then
Albatross is potentially able to continue normally, preserving
both consistency and availability.
E. Probabilistic finality
When receiving a transaction it is important to know if the
transaction can be reversed because of a fork. Albatross only
offers provable finality at macro blocks, which might be too
far apart to be useful for most use cases. However, Albatross
does have very strong probabilistic finality.
Only malicious validators will create, or build on, a fork
or an invalid block. Such a series of illegal blocks is called a
malicious subchain.
Since every slot has a specific owner, as soon as we reach a
slot controlled by a rational validator, the malicious subchain
is resolved. There is no way for the subchain to continue past
that slot. So, the only way for an attacker to create a malicious
subchain of length d is for him to be the slot owner for d slots
in a row.
The main security assumption of Albatross is that, if we
have a validator list of size n = 3f + 1, then there are at
most f malicious validators (or colluding rational validators).
Thus, for our analysis, we assume the worst case of an attacker
controlling f validators. Given that the slot owner selection is
random, the probability of the attacker being a slot owner for
d slots in a row is:
P (d) =
(
f
n
)d
≈
(
n/3
n
)d
=
(
1
3
)d
= 3−d (4)
This means that the probability of a transaction being
reverted, because it is on a malicious subchain, decreases
exponentially. Based on the worst case scenario, a client can
easily calculate the probability that a transaction is final by
taking into account the number of blocks built on top of the
block that includes the transaction.
We can see from table VII-E that a certainty of 99.9% is
reached after only 6 blocks (including the block containing
the transaction).
TABLE III
PROBABILITY OF A TRANSACTION BEING FINAL AFTER n BLOCKS
Blocks 1 2 3 4 5 6
P (%) 66.6 88.9 96.3 98.8 99.6 99.9
F. Transaction censorship
Lastly, we want to discuss transaction censorship. Since the
client can gossip a transaction to the entire validator list, as
long as there is one honest active validator, there is a high
probability that a block containing the transaction will be
produced. The transaction can still be censored by creating
a view change, given that the censor has control of 2f + 1
validators.
Hence, as long as there is a single honest active validator
and the censor does not control 2f+1 validators, a transaction
cannot be censored indefinitely.
VIII. UPGRADES
When a new software version of a blockchain is released it
is said to be a fork and it is normally divided in one of two
types: soft forks and hard forks.
A soft fork changes the protocol in such a way that it
strictly reduces the set of valid transactions. In other words,
all transactions that are valid in the new version are also valid
in the old version, but the converse is not true.
A hard fork in the other hand introduces transactions that
are not valid in the old version. Transactions that were valid in
the old version may or may not be valid in the newer version,
and that distinguishes between strictly expanding hard forks
and bilateral hard forks.
The main difference between the two is that in hard forks
the users need to upgrade to the new version in order to remain
in the chain, soft forks don’t require the users to upgrade. The
consequence of this is that hard forks are much more likely
to lead to chain splits than soft forks.
However, this is only true for blockchains that pre-
fer availability over consistency, for example in proof-of-
work blockchains. But for Albatross and other PBFT-like
blockchains, and in fact for any blockchain that prefers consis-
tency over availability, it is not possible to have chain splits.
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Fig. 1. Venn diagram illustrating the different types of forks
So it does not make sense to speak of soft forks and hard
forks, instead we will simply call them upgrades.
For simplicity, we will define that upgrades in Albatross
only happen during macro blocks. This makes the rest of this
analysis simpler and also more relevant for other PBFT-like
consensus algorithms.
To upgrade the blockchain, the following protocol would be
run:
1) The macro block leader proposes a block with the new
version rules.
2) If he can get the required 2f + 1 signatures, then the
block becomes part of the blockchain and the blockchain
is upgraded.
3) Otherwise, the leader will be subject to a view change
and the new leader will just propose a block using the
old version rules.
Note that in no circumstance there is a chain split, the
blockchain will either upgrade or not, but it will remain as
one chain. Of course, allowing the validators who did not
upgrade their clients to stay in the validator set is dangerous
and could cause the chain to halt 11. These validators that
refuse to upgrade, even though they were behaving honestly
prior to the upgrade and have a right to refuse to upgrade,
become malicious validators after the upgrade.
Thus it is logical to expel the non-upgraded validators from
the validator set, and letting them rejoin after they upgrade.
This leads to a better upgrade protocol:
1) A new software client is released and an upgrade is
proposed on-chain.
2) Validators that download the new client also publish on-
chain their intention to support the upgrade.
11Since the validator list is sampled at random from the larger validator set,
you could end up in a situation where the validators that refused to upgrade
are less than 1
3
of the validator set but more than 1
3
of the validator list. Since
those validators would still be operating under the old rules, they would refuse
to build on the new chain which would eventually result in the chain halting.
3) During macro blocks the leader evaluates if more than
2
3 of the validator set has stated that they support the
upgrade.
4) If not, then the macro block leader proposes a block
with the old version rules. If yes, he proposes a block
with the new version rules.
5) If he cannot get the required 2f + 1 signatures, then a
view change will happen and the new leader will propose
a block with the old version rules.
6) Otherwise, if he can get the required 2f + 1 signatures,
then the block becomes part of the blockchain and the
blockchain is upgraded.
7) After the upgrade, all validators that did not support the
upgrade are automatically unstaked. The validator list
then is sampled only from the validators that supported
the upgrade.
This new protocol, besides stopping the blockchain from
halting, also prevents validators from proposing failing up-
grades by allowing validators to signal their support or oppo-
sition to the future upgrade.
However, by expelling the validators that do not wish to
upgrade, we may also end up increasing the fraction of mali-
cious validators. Since malicious validators can, by definition,
act arbitrarily we have to assume the worst scenario. In this
case, the worst scenario is that all of the malicious validators
choose to upgrade.
Of course, the network could halt if the fraction of malicious
validators post-upgrade is larger than 13 of the validator set. If
we require the fraction of malicious validators to be smaller
than 13 after the upgrade, what is the maximum fraction of
malicious validators that we can have before the upgrade?
Let us imagine that an upgrade is only attempted if at least a
fraction t of the validator set publicly supports it. Furthermore
we will assume that all of the malicious validators support the
upgrade. Since we require that exactly 13 of the validator set
post-upgrade is malicious, then we can divide the pre-upgrade
validator set in three fractions:
• (1− t) of validators that do not support the upgrade.
• 13 t of validators that support the upgrade and are mali-
cious.
• 23 t of validators that support the upgrade and are rational
or honest.
Given all of the above information, we can state the follow-
ing conjecture:
Imagine a partially synchronous Byzantine tolerant
consensus algorithm that favors consistency over availability
and that only upgrades whenever a fraction t of the nodes
support it. The upgrade can only be executed safely if the
fraction of malicious nodes is smaller than 13 t.
Given that t ≤ 1 we can conclude that any PBFT-like
consensus algorithm is weaker during an upgrade.
For Albatross specifically, the threshold t must also be larger
than 23 since otherwise the nodes that oppose the upgrade can
refuse to finalize any block containing the upgrade. But if the
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threshold is much larger than 23 then malicious validators can
stop any upgrade by simply refusing to support it. In the limit,
when t = 1 a single malicious validator can force the chain
to never be upgraded.
We propose a threshold of 23 which means that, during
an upgrade, Albatross is only secure up to 29n malicious
validators.
IX. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we give a brief theoretical analysis of the
performance of Albatross. We show that, in the optimistic
case, it achieves the theoretical limit for single-chain PoS
algorithms, while in the pessimist case it still achieves decent
performance.
A. Optimistic case
The best possible case is when the network is synchronous
(all messages are delivered within a maximum delay d), the
network delay d is smaller than the timeout parameter ∆ and
all validators are honest.
The macro blocks have a message complexity of O(n2),
since they are produced with PBFT, but they constitute a very
small percentage of all blocks so, the overall performance is
mostly correlated with the micro block production. Moreover,
approaches such as Handel [16] can be used to reduce this
message complexity.
Micro blocks have a message complexity of O(1). In fact,
they only require the propagation of the block. The latency, if
we ignore the time spent verifying blocks and transactions, is
equal to the block propagation time, which is on the order of
the network delay d.
In conclusion, Albatross, in the optimistic case, produces
blocks as fast as the network allows it.
B. Pessimistic case
If we relax some of the assumptions made for the optimistic
case, Albatross still has a performance superior to PBFT. There
are three different cases that we will consider:
• Malicious validators: The worst case, while still main-
taining security, is a scenario with f validators being
malicious and refusing to produce blocks. In this case, we
can expect one view change every three blocks. The view
change protocol requires O(n) messages and waiting for
a timeout. So, in this case, the message complexity will
be O(n) and the latency will be on the order of ∆.
• Network delay larger than timeout: If d > ∆ then,
because the timeout increases linearly, every block will
only be produced after a given number of view changes
and several short-lived forks may be created for each
block. In this case, because we still only rely on the
view change protocol, the message complexity will be
O(n) and the latency will be greater than d.
• Partially synchronous network: Under partial syn-
chrony, there are periods where the network becomes
asynchronous, before returning to synchrony. In this case,
it is possible to completely halt progress of the blockchain
while the network is asynchronous. However, Albatross
will return to normal operation when the network be-
comes synchronous again.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we described and analyzed Albatross, a novel
consensus algorithm inspired by speculative BFT algorithms.
To achieve Albatross we modified PBFT in three main ways:
(1) making it permissionless by selecting a validator list
proportionally to stake, (2) increasing resistance to adaptive
adversaries by only selecting block producers on the previous
block using a VRF and (3) increasing performance by relying
on speculative execution of blocks.
Despite sacrificing provable finality, Albatross has a strong
probabilistic finality which, when coupled with low block la-
tency, means that transactions can have a very high probability
of being final in just a few seconds.
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